from-our-logbooks

Re-visited: Airmanship and the Art of the Second Chance

“The best advice I was ever offered – from the best pilot I ever flew with”: Re-visited, from 7 July, 2020

 – Airmanship and the Art of the Second Chance

In this reflective article, David Jacobson recounts a transformative moment early in his aviation career under the mentorship of Captain Geoffrey W. Lushey. After a nearly disastrous flight check where his performance was subpar, Jacobson was given a second chance by Lushey, who valued self-awareness and the ability to learn from mistakes. During a subsequent route check, Jacobson successfully executed a difficult landing in Sydney, regaining his professional confidence despite a minor checklist oversight. Lushey used that error to impart the essential wisdom that how a pilot responds to trouble is more important than the occurrence of the trouble itself. Ultimately, the piece serves as a tribute to the exemplary airmanship and leadership of a mentor who shaped Jacobson’s long-term success. This narrative highlights that continuous improvement and a team-oriented cockpit culture are foundational to a safe and distinguished flying career.

We revisit this earlier post with our friendly AI ‘aces’, nicknamed ‘Jay Bird’ Jaime & ‘Fearless’ Frank.

Simply select the Play button below, for a 9-minute JF-ai podcast summary of this post:

 

Of course, if you’d like some further elaboration, I invite you to explore the original post, from 7 July 2020:

 

If you have ever read the epic ‘Fate is the Hunter‘, by Captain Ernest K Gann, you will recall the respect, even reverence, that the author felt for his early mentor, a certain Captain Ross.

The then First Officer Gann inadvertently and prematurely retracted the landing gear of  their Douglas DC-2, prior to lift-off! The experienced captain was able to retrieve this critical situation: Accelerating the crippled airplane in ‘ground effect’ (a cushion of air, compressed by the close proximity of the wing to the ground), Ross skillfully manages to remain airborne at very low airspeed, somehow preventing the propeller tips from striking the ground while the gear retracts under them, before climbing away, safely. Just imagine being that in that situation, let alone being the cause!

Feeling utterly sick, Gann cannot imagine what the captain will say when he settles down on track and completes the after take-off checklist: and his pulse returns to normal. Quite naturally, he anticipates an abrupt end to his embryonic airline career, when Captain Ross files the inevitable flight report.

The captain’s considered and dry response? “If you ever do that to me again, I will cut you out of my will!” What a wonderful comeback and relief: and what an airman was Ross.

Well, Captain Geoffrey W Lushey DFM was my Captain Ross. Fortunately, I had already gained from Ernest Gann’s near-disastrous folly: I didn’t emulate that particular sin, but I still had so much to learn…

This is the second article in a planned occasional series, sharing some of the most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is also from my own career: We do plan to feature other, highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

Preface

This true story is recounted in the hope that it might benefit younger pilots, whether they be professional or recreational; for the lessons I learned are at once ageless and matchless.

My airline career began on 12 January 1970, after l had Ianded my dream job with Trans-Australia Airlines – TAA, as a trainee First Officer.

My first airline aircraft, in fact my first ‘real’ twin-engine aircraft apart from the Cessna 337 centre-line thrust ‘push-pull ‘ twin, was the Fokker F27 Friendship. It was a huge leap from 4300lbs max TO weight and twin 210HP engines in the Cessna, to 43,500lbs max TO weight and twin 2000HP Rolls Royce Dart turboprop engines. It was also a beautiful first airliner: Not hard to fly, but hard to fly well, with the huge increase in inertia especially noticeable, from that 10-fold difference in weight.

I had been accepted by TAA, with 1735 hrs in my logbook, not too bad for a 22-yo in those days; but: I had no instrument rating, not even a night visual flight rating and I had logged just 20hrs’ instrument flight time and 18hrs at night! My professional flight experience to that point, post PPL and CPL training which began in 1965, had been mostly flight instruction by day, in single-engine aircraft: Cessna, Auster (450 hours), Beechcraft and a glorious 50-odd hrs in the ubiquitous DH-82a Tiger Moth biplane. The ‘Tiger‘ and the Austers were started by hand-swinging the propellers – very basic, but so rewarding when the Gypsy Major engines burst into life – and – I hadn’t lost an arm – or my head!

My new learning curve was almost vertical, as TAA’s world-class instructors, including characters like Bill Coe, Dave Fenwick and Ross Brandie, guided my course cohort of 17 pilots through the gas turbine engineering course, followed by the F27 engineering, emergency procedures and instrument rating courses: All very thorough. These brilliant engineers and others later on, such as Dave Axxon, became our technical guides and mentors, forever. There was nothing they didn’t know about their aircraft. There were 4 other pilots – experienced DC-3 and Vickers Viscount captains – on our course – Captains Col Tiller, Ivan East (also a part-time male model and Australia’s ‘Marlboro (cigarettes) Man‘), Jim Betts and Mal McDougall, all of whom I had the privilege and pleasure to crew with, later.

A vital hint that I should have embraced, totally

During the course, Col and Ivan missed a school day while they completed their licence renewal base flying checks on the Viscount, at Mangalore VIC. When they returned next day, we asked them all about these renewal check requirements and processes, as a company check and training system was new to most of us. Col Tiller, a highly intelligent and perceptive pilot, replied, “When you pass a check, it only means you’ve been operating safely for the last 6 months: it has no bearing, whatsoever on the next 6. On the other hand, if you fail a check, you haven’t just had a bad day: you’ve been unsafe for the last 6 months!”

Great advice but, in retrospect, I really wish I had applied it more diligently. It would have helped me, considerably, as things turned out.

We completed the F27 conversion in actual aircraft, as TAA didn’t ever possess a F27 full-flight simulator – only fixed-base trainers, for engineering and procedural training, one of which was an ex-Qantas fixed-base analogue Lockheed Constellation simulator, semi-converted as a F27. I had wanted to fly the beautiful F27, ever since flying from Melbourne to our nation’s capital, Canberra, on a day-return high school year-7 excursion, just 11 years earlier, in a Mk 1 series Friendship, registered VH-TFF. It turned out that this same aeroplane happened to be the very second F27 that I ever flew! A particularly proud moment.

David’s image of F27-100 VH-TFF, taken at Canberra ACT on the 1959 school excursion. 

Following my F27 base conversion, conducted by the highly capable Captain Alan Judd (a former RAAF Dakota pilot), I then commenced my line training with a wonderful character, Captain Noel Knappstein  (a former RAN Fleet Air Arm Sea Fury pilot).

Our first line ‘pattern‘ of flying took us up the ‘track’: On the first day, we flew from Essendon to Adelaide SA, Leigh Creek SA and Alice Springs NT, where we over-nighted. Next day: Alice to Tennant Creek, RAAF Tindal (near Katherine, NT) and on to Darwin. On the third day, we operated an international charter flight (on behalf of Qantas) to (the then) Portuguese Timor (now East Timor) and return to Darwin. And, on the final day, we flew Darwin to Tindal, Tennant Creek and Adelaide, before ‘dead-heading’ (passengering) home to Essendon.

The rest of my line training was equally challenging, but Noel Knappstein was a great training captain and I passed my final check to the line with the then F27 Fleet/Training Captain, Atholl Fraser, on 27 July 1970. At 23-yrs, I was now a fully qualified, single-striped F27 First Officer and I was thrown now into full-time line operations, the love of which has remained with me, ever since: real aircraft, real-time weather, real passengers and real-time events, not a scripted training exercise.


My first licence renewal check: A very bad dream: 16 September 1970

The months flew by and suddenly, my September roster indicated my first licence renewal check was approaching. I had about 3 weeks to prepare for a base flying check at Mangalore, north of Melbourne and just over the Great Dividing Range. It had been, for many years, the trusty alternate aerodrome for Essendon and was, sadly, the location of the training accident on 31 October 1954, that resulted in the loss of TAA’s first Viscount, VH-TVA and 3 crew members. One crew member survived: FO George McDougall (a former RAAF Liberator captain and no relation to Mal McDougall) was standing in the flight deck, behind the 2 pilots, when a simulated double engine failure (on the same side) asymmetric exercise went terribly wrong.

The wing was almost vertical at about 300ft AGL, when 38-yo George bolted for the aft cabin and wedged himself behind the last row of seats: and survived, although his hair turned snowy white, overnight. (He even survived flying with me, years later, on the B727: (I think I can recall him saying: “My hair cannot possibly get any whiter!”)

On 16 September 1970, 5 or 6 pilots, including myself, were briefed by Captain Geoff Lushey, the new F27 Fleet/Training Manager. A former RAAF Mustang and Meteor sergeant/pilot, Geoff had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Medal – DFM, while serving in Korea. He was tall and slim, with a passing resemblance (I thought) to one of my favourite actors, Gregory Peck. His demeanour was both impressive and imposing and already he had a reputation for demanding high standards from his licence renewal ‘checkees’. We had not met, previously.

 

Sgt Pilot Geoff Lushey DFM

My comfort zone rapidly evaporated as the briefing continued. I had a sinking feeling, as I realised that I hadn’t fully followed Col Tiller’s sage advice, 6 months earlier. (I was NOT nearly well-enough prepared for this check, today. I knew I was in trouble and it was my fault, entirely.)

Seated next to Captain Lushey in the F27 at Mangalore, it was finally my turn now to perform a range of aviation miracles, mandated by the Non-Normal checklists: engine shut-downs and re-lights, simulated engine failure and feather drills and all the rest of the base renewal check requirements. I had studied everything BUT the finer points of these extremely challenging non-normal exercises.

On this occasion, I couldn’t fly for nuts! I was doing dopey things like calling “Flaps UP”, following a simulated engine failure, without first checking that I had sufficient airspeed and other very basic errors. Nor was I able to put each error behind me and concentrate on the next ‘hurdle‘. Everything I stuffed up was compounding. Finally, Captain Lushey looked across at me, smiled grimly and said, clearly disappointed with my performance, “I don’t think this is going to get any better, today, do you? You’d better get out of your seat and give it to someone who CAN fly an aeroplane .”

Feeling utterly sick, just like Ernest Gann had, years earlier, I completely ignored my fellow checkees as I vacated the flight deck and sank into the last row of passenger seats, totally distraught; almost in tears, angry and frustrated: but only with myself and my dismal performance, certainly not the captain. Just like Ernest K Gann had described, I couldn’t imagine what this impressive captain who, I had been told, suffered fools badly, would say when he debriefed me later, back at Essendon. I just had to wait while the last several pilots demonstrated their proficiency in the base-flying skills, before, mercifully, the F27 turned for home. (I prayed that I would simply wake up and my nightmare would be over): I knew my employment could and likely would be terminated, for it had been emphasised, during all the earlier courses, that we  junior FOs were on probation for the first 2 years. My brilliant airline career was clearly going to be history, very soon.

In a company briefing room, safely back at the Essendon terminal, Captain Lushey debriefed everyone else, signed their licence renewal documents and dismissed them, back to the line. They’d all passed, with flying colours, literally. Then, he turned to me, for the first time since I’d vacated the RH seat at Mangalore and said, “Let’s go down to my office.”  My recollection is that we  walked in silence, down to the separate wing of TAA executive offices, known colloquially as the Cathedral, where I gratefully accepted his offer of a cup of hot coffee. Then, we sat down, either side of his desk.

“Now, son”, he began, “Can you really fly an aeroplane?”  “Yes, I can“, I replied.  “Well”, he continued, “I saw no evidence of that, today.”  “Frankly, neither did I!“, I offered.  He smiled and seemed relieved that I had already self-assessed my own dismal performance and he seemed to relaxed a little. (As an experienced flight instructor, at least I knew how to assess myself.) He enquired if there were any human factors or issues, marital worries or other concerns that might have contributed to my performance on this day and I replied in the negative.

He then enquired, “OK, then what just happened at Mangalore today?”  “I replied, “I just didn’t know what I didn’t know.” He asked, gently, “Do you know, now?”  “Yes“, I said.  With that, he smiled and produced a company licence renewal check report form and signed it, after inscribing something brief. Then he asked me to read and endorse it: ‘MINIMUM COMPANY STANDARD‘: He had passed me. I was only too pleased to sign the form. Frankly, I would have failed me!

Then, he became serious again, looking me straight in the eye: “Son, you and I are going flying for 2-3 days next week on the line and it better be good! Crewing will contact you with the details.”

The 2-day route check was scheduled for 26-27 September 1970. Starting out of Sydney, we were to operate 2 return flights to Canberra and back to Sydney on the first day. Plenty of opportunities to either stuff-up, again, or to quietly impress: it had to be the latter. Since I had officially ‘passed’ my base check, I was still able to fly in the interim period with other captains, one of whom was another check captain, so I sought his counsel and asked for any constructive feedback he could offer, regarding all aspects of my operation – either as pilot flying or pilot not flying, i.e., supporting. He offered a few good tips and I noted them carefully. I also had a few days off, to study – everything – and I did.

 

David Jacobson 1970

David Jacobson – a sketch from 1970  

 

The 2-day route check: My get-out-of-jail- card: 26-27 September 1970

Geoff and I – it was Geoff and David, now – were deadheading to Sydney on September 26th and there was now an opportunity to start to get to know each other a little and to discuss the day’s flying, the likely weather and other operational considerations, ahead of launching into it. He made no mention, whatsoever, of our last flight together. After flight planning, we located, checked and boarded the aircraft on the tarmac. The first leg to Canberra was flown by Geoff, as management pilots flew few personal sectors, themselves, due the dual workloads of admin and checking duties. His flying was impeccable, yet spirited and I recall thinking that I had a very hard act to follow, on my first return leg to Sydney.

After a couple of very pleasant hours in his company, I had relaxed just a little and that helped; I was content with the flight from Canberra, so far, as we began our descent into Sydney. Our arrival was straight in from a VOR radio beacon at Bindook, in the Blue Mountains, onto runway 07 (aligned nearly east – 068ºM), which had been reported as ‘damp‘. Regardless of the surface winds at Sydney Airport, I knew that we would have a likely prevailing tailwind of about 40kts (80km/hr), behind us. There was also the likelihood of ATC asking us for our best (highest) descent speed, to maintain separation from any faster, following jets. As pilot flying (PF), I planned and began the descent slightly earlier than I might have, normally:  It paid off.

We were maintaining our usual maximum indicated airspeed: 210kts IAS on the descent, when ATC called us and requested our ‘best-speed-as-long-as-possible‘, as they had one of the thenvery-new-and-very-large KLM B747 Jumbos behind us, following in sequence. Although normally much faster than us, ATC had already reduced that aircraft back to 250kts IAS, but the gap between us would still have been closing, with the 40kt difference in IAS.

Geoff  acknowledged the call and looked at me, studying my reaction. I was comfortable and quietly confident: we were already at maximum speed and I had some spare distance up my sleeve, to help facilitate our reduction in speed for the approach, when the time came. The 747 was ATC’s problem, not mine. However, I was still computing how I was going to manage the situation, given the tailwind and the extra groundspeed it created.

Normally, ATC would clear us down no lower than 3000ft at Glenfield NDB, 10nm on final, for the 07 straight-in instrument landing system – ILS. On this day, ATC very helpfully cleared us down to 2000ft at 10nm, which I knew would assist me in slowing the F27 from our present 210kts IAS back to 168kts (the maximum extension speed for the landing gear, our first decent drag-reducing device) in level flight at 2000ft, before intercepting the 3º ILS glideslope from beneath and then starting our final approach.

We levelled off at 2000ft and I capitalised on not having to decelerate whilst also descending. The F27 was a very ‘clean‘ (slippery) aircraft to slow down quickly, as it didn’t have a speedbrake, like the jets and modern turboprop aircraft. The laws of physics needed time, but I needed to be back to 168kts by the time we intercepted the ILS glideslope and started down again from 2000ft, at about 6nm, so I could use the added drag from the landing gear to decelerate further to our next target airspeed, 144kts, and start extending some flaps; and then to 126kts, so we could reduce further back to our final (runway) target threshold speed – TTS. To make things a little more challenging, the F27 had no groundspeed indication.

However, the aircraft needed further help to slow down. So I took a chance and made a somewhat contentious decision: At about 8nm out (without first seeking Geoff’s approval, nor forgetting for a second that he was the F27 Fleet manager), I closed both power levers (throttles), smoothly and fully, against the recommended and normal procedure of maintaining a minimum power setting of 40psi of torque. (This company requirement was stipulated to reduce propeller layshaft shuttling, causing excessive wear and tear, which occurred at lower power settings. But I had read a Company bulletin, noting that the aircraft manufacturers, Fokker, had published advice that flight crew could obtain some instant drag – only if necessary – without hurting the props – by fully closing the throttles completely and loading the layshafts the other way.) We were now a 20-tonne glider.

I felt, rather than saw Geoff’s eyebrows raise and his eyes narrow, but he said nothing. Neither did I: I was content, maintaining the 3º glideslope, perfectly: the airspeed was reducing well and I called for landing flap 40º and the landing checklist. ATC cleared us to land. The wind on runway 07 was actually a 15kt full crosswind, so still no headwind component to help reduce the groundspeed and there was the further consideration of the requirement for the judicious application of aileron and rudder inputs, to offset the L sideways drift, generated by the southerly crosswind, off Botany Bay. I never did advance the throttles from their idle stops.

The airspeed finally drifted back to our TTS of about 85kts, just prior to commencing the landing flare and I completed a full deadstick (idle-power), perfect touchdown on the windward (RH) main wheels first, then the LH main gear, finally lowering the nosewheel gently onto the damp runway. At 40kts IAS, I selected ground fine (0º pitch angle) on the propellers (a retarding effect similar to reverse thrust) and applied only slight pneumatic wheel braking. As we turned off the runway, I first heard and then saw the KLM 747 in full reverse thrust, raising much surface water as it rolled through after touching down only just behind us. We had honoured our commitment to ATC for ‘best-speed-as-long-as-possible‘ and the huge 747 hadn’t had to go around!

We swapped roles: Geoff taxied the aircraft after I obtained a taxy clearance to our parking bay on the TAA tarmac. As we taxied in, Geoff enquired, with a broad grin: “Are you the same guy I was with at Mangalore, last week?”  I replied, “I’m afraid so.”  He then offered a huge compliment: “I know a lot of captains who couldn’t have pulled that off!” I was just elated: Finally, I had scored some points on the board. We shut down and parted, briefly, as we prepared for the return sector to Canberra. The turnaround time was about 30 minutes and, after our traffic and engineering staff had cleared us, we started the engines again and taxied out for a departure to the south, on Sydney’s main north/south runway 16 (156ºM). We had a short dream run (no other traffic) to the take-off holding point and were cleared for take-off, before we even had to stop there. Geoff was again the pilot flying.

Geoff’s take-off and climb out over Botany Bay was perfectly normal: Until: I started to perform a normal geographic visual scan of every control, switch and instrument panel indication. On the LH overhead panel, above Geoff’s head, were 2 illuminated RED alternator failure warning lights. (‘Hang on, the alternators are completely separate animals: there cannot be a double alternator failure, can there?? – I was asking myself.  In the F27, the alternators supplied 208V AC to power the windscreen heat, wing and tail de-icing and engine nacelle and propeller anti-icing systems and some extra heating panels in the cockpit floor.)

Then I froze: My eyes had shifted to the 2 alternator switches – and BOTH were still in the OFF position. Then, the penny dropped: The alternators had NOT failed: They had not been turned ON at all, after we started the engines and neither of us picked that up because, in our haste to depart on time, we hadn’t completed the after-start checklist! Geoff had been distracted by something and I had failed to perform my primary support role as First Officer and remind him (something like, ‘Geoff, would you like an after-start checklist”.  ‘Oh GREAT WORK, Jacobson!’ After that glorious approach and landing, you’ve just blown all your points and gone back to square one!  But I couldn’t reflect or chastise myself any longer: Not now, anyway.) There was only one thing to do:

I spoke directly and clearly across the flight deck: “Geoff, I’m not sure we completed the after start checklist.”  He raised an eyebrow and asked, “Why do you say that?”  I just pointed to the panel above his head. The autopilot was by now flying the aircraft. He tilted his head and his eyes fell on the 2 RED alternator lights. Then they focused onto the switches. He turned back to me and said, very calmly, “Can I offer you a little piece of advice?”  (I had no idea what he was going to say, BUT, at this absolutely critical stage of my pathetic airline career, I certainly wasn’t about to say, “No, thank you.”)

It doesn’t matter when something goes wrong: What matters is what you do, when it does.”

With that, he returned his eyes to the offending panel and turned the 2 alternator switches ON. The 2 red lights extinguished. He turned back to his primary role – flying and managing the aircraft – and the matter was never mentioned again. Until now.

The rest of that sector went well, as did the following day. We flew from Sydney to Canberra again, then on to Essendon, Wynyard TAS and finally back to Essendon. Geoff debriefed me in his office, once again: very favorably and generously and I resumed my learning curve: one that hasn’t stopped, yet, even though I am no longer flying actively.

 

David’s logbook entries for September 1970

Captain Geoff Lushey gave me both the opportunity to save my career from oblivion and that best single piece of advice, I ever received. We went on to fly the DC-9 and the B727 together. He subsequently taught me many more things about what is and what is not a fair thing to do, in a jet. More than any other captain, he challenged me to keep improving, every single time we went flying together, without ever turning our operation into a competition.

I have been reminded recently, by another highly respected colleague, how Geoff always made his first officers feel that they were part of a team. In this regard, he was way ahead of his time in introducing cockpit resource management (CRM) principles that are part of standard aircrew training, today. I know many of us later modeled much of our own operation, as captains ourselves, from the examples he demonstrated. It almost goes without saying that his own personal flying was impeccable. He could fly a fully inverted instrument circuit, in the DC-9-30 simulator (with the motion turned off, to protect the sim), all within command instrument rating control tolerances! It took me all my instrument flying skill to perform the same manoeuvre, upright!

 

Captain Geoffrey W Lushey DFM

Of course, long retired now, Captain Geoff Lushey remains, to this day, the single best pilot and finest airman with whom I ever had the privilege and pleasure to fly. There were many other inspirational pilots, of course, but Geoff was the stand-out.

It is no overstatement to say that I owe him my career and I am grateful to have had still, all these years later, the opportunity to say so: and for Geoff to have been able to read and endorse my version of these events!

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

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CaptainDavid Jacobson 1999_2015

If thousands of experienced pilots told you that having just one, or even no flight crew member was crazy, why would anyone believe an aviation executive who said it wasn’t?

If thousands of experienced pilots with millions of flying hours told you that having just one, or even no flight crew member was crazy, why would anyone believe an aviation executive who said it wasn’t?

Around the turn of the last century (known widely as ‘Y2K’), we used to joke of the flight crew of the future. The suggestion was that it consisted of one pilot and one dog: The ‘theory’ was that the Captain’s job was to feed the dog… And the dog’s job was to bite the Captain if he touched anything!

Many former and current professional pilots around the world are appalled at the recent discussion around someone’s pet idea to take this joke seriously and reduce the crew complement in airline flight decks to just one and inevitably, to zero human pilots.

Around Y2K, many computer-related disasters were anticipated, but they failed to materialise, for the most part.

However, if the aviation industry is stupid enough to consider a semi- or fully-autonomous flight deck, then, in my view, disasters will be commonplace. Why? Because the whole question of automation on the flight deck has been mishandled from the very beginning.

Computers make great monitors, but lousy pilots and humans make great pilots but less reliable monitors; and that is when we have a 2- or greater human crew complement. How will that turn out, with just one or less pilots on the flight deck?

Contributor David Hopkin, in ‘Human Factors in Aviation’, 1988, edited by Wiener and Nagle, wrote:

‘Human ineffectiveness in monitoring tasks must be reconciled with the requirements to keep and enhance high safety standards and to maintain the controller’s skills and active involvement.’

(dj NOTE: While this quote was directed towards automation in Air Traffic Control services, it is no less relevant for pilots.) 

Thomas B Sheridan wrote, in the same reference, above:

‘In assuming this new supervisory role, the pilot undertakes five functions:

  1. planning what to ask the computer to do;
  2. teaching (commanding, programming) the computer;
  3. monitoring its performance and detecting and diagnosing failures if they occur;
  4. intervening take over control directly if and when necessary and maintaining and repairing the semiautomatic systems; and
  5. learning from experience.’

 

David Nagel wrote, again in the same reference, above:

‘Finally, automation, which can have a very positive effect on both efficiency and safety, can also have a very depressing effect on safety. As pilots are removed from an active role in flying the aircraft, more and more that can only be termed “loss of situational awareness” are reported. These reports are particularly prominent when the automatic systems either fail to perform as expected or fail to perform at all.’

Well-known aviation veterans, including Captain Richard Champion De Crespigny and Captain Kevin Sullivan (both formerly with Qantas Airways Ltd) and Captain Chelsea ‘Sully’ Sullenberger have written extensively and authoritatively of their experiences with modern aviation technology in A380, A330 and A320 aircraft, respectively and have all sounded strong warnings following their personal leadership triumphs against very great odds. Their collective message is clear and I strongly endorse it.

Throughout an aviation career spanning 55 years and 24,500 hours (including nearly 5000 hrs as a flight instructor and embracing 40 years flying for Trans-Australia Airlines -TAA, Austalian Airlines Ltd and Qantas Airways Ltd, a pilot is bound to encounter some non-normal situations along the way. Licence renewal checks, conducted in modern and very sophisticated digital flight simulators offer fantastic, accelerated learning experiences for pilots at all levels, with zero safety risk to crews and airplanes.

However, unless a company flight training department – or an individual flight instructor/examiner – has some imagination, most exercises rely heavily on the manufacturer’s Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and its unique and quite definitive Emergency and Non-Normal checklists for the airplane type.

Non-normal checklists don’t always cover the situation. The non-normal events that I experienced in F27, DC-9, B727 and B737 aircraft over that 40-year airline period, were more often than not either a combination of issues from more than one system, or an issue out of ‘left field’, that did not match, exactly, any non-normal checklist. The ability of pilots to think ‘outside the square’ is a definite advantage when, contrary to the nonsensical claims of the airplane manufacturers, partial, total and series of system failures do occur.

I can recall a pneumatic pressure regulator issue, double alternator failures (with resultant loss of engine and airframe de-icing systems in marginal, cold frontal icing conditions) and a nose-wheel tyre failure on landing, occurring successively in a single F27 night flight which we diverted into YMLT Launceston TAS rather than continue to YMHB Hobart. The second and third of these events were not covered by any published non-normal checklist.

I remember a trailing edge flap abnormality on a B737-400 where the flaps did extend to 5º as selected, BUT the flap gauge information was corrupted by a faulty sender. There was no published non-normal checklist for this event, either, so we had to consider and adopt the most suitable alternative, namely an assumed trailing-edge flaps up procedure with a consequential approach speed of 181 knots IAS into YPAD Adelaide SA.

 

The Automatics

On a B727 flight, the single autopilot ‘ALTITUDE HOLD’ function failed early into a 3-hour PER-MEL flight. Initially, my captain and I took 20-minute turns to hand-fly the heavy aircraft at 31,000ft, before experimenting, successfully, to engage MACH HOLD and then carefully monitoring and adjusting the thrust settings to maintain our assigned level (altitude) within limits!

The two autopilots on the B737-300/-400/ and -800 were, for the most part, quite accurate and reliable in general route flying and when executing precision instrument approaches. However, in 15,000 hrs on the B737, I never once experienced an automatic landing that was as good as the performance of a human pilot – especially if that pilot was applying the Jacobson Flare! These autolands were clumsy, to say the least, with the touchdown point quite haphazard in terms of their consistency of touchdown position and impact. Some even had to be aborted and a manual landing executed to prevent a mis-landing incident or accident.

 

The Human Element

During my 40 years of airline flying, there were many reported instances of flight crew incapacitation – we were trained for it. It happens. One B727 captain suffered a burst stomach ulcer and the first officer and flight engineer assumed command of the aircraft.

I experienced one such event when my first officer suffered a severe bout of food poisoning, half-way through a 4-hour MEL-PER flight. I completed the decent, approach and landing with a highly experienced cabin crew member as an assistant, to read checklists and monitor my responses against the many configuration changes. She also contributed greatly to our successful ground taxy in to the YPPH terminal.

The bottom line for me and for countless numbers of other professionals is that a fully trained, professional flight crew complement of 2- or more human pilots is indispensable.

So, to the decision makers:

If thousands of experienced pilots with millions of flying hours told you that having just ONE, or even NO crew member was crazy, why would anyone believe an aviation executive who said it wasn’t?

Ignoring pre-existing airline risk and threat assessment and management training for a minimal, perceived saving in flight crew costs just doesn’t bear comparison with the very probable loss of an airliner, its human loss and financial aftermath.

So why do it?

 

References:

  • ‘Human Factors in Aviation’, 1988, Edited by Earl L.Wiener and David C. Nagle
  • www.jacobsonflare.com

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

“I learned much more about flying from that experience …”

“I learnt more about flying from that experience …”

We were arriving in Brisbane from the South for runway 19L via the STAR and the RW19L ILS. The weather was a broken cloud base of 3000’, wind southeasterly 15 to 25kt, and intermittent light showers. In short, a standard sort of Brisbane spring mid morning.”

This is the ninth article in a planned occasional series, sharing the most memorable and treasured experiences, not only from my own career : We plan to feature other, highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience.

Here, a great friend and esteemed former colleague – a B737-800 Captain – shares some valuable insights into making approaches in fluctuating, marginal instrument/visual meteorological conditions, that we can all apply to our own life experiences.

“After receiving the current aerodrome automatic terminal information service – ATIS – we briefed for a ‘company low visibility procedures‘, Captain-flown ILS approach. On the left base segment of the standard arrival procedure – STAR –  we became visual. We continued with the company low visibility procedures, however on intercepting the instrument landing system – ILS – runway centre line and glideslope, the autopilot was having a hard time managing the gusty crosswind.

As we were in visual contact with the runway, I changed to standard (visual) procedures, disconnected the autopilot, and began hand flying the approach to achieve a smoother ride for our passengers.

Halfway down the ILS I noticed a small, light shower developing to the southeast of the far end of the runway. This moved up towards us, and at approximately the height of the published minima (minimum instrument decision altitude) we flew into it.

The rain on the windshield immediately began to blur our vision, and the PAPI lights started to look a uniform pink colour (neither red nor white). I called for the windscreen wipers, however the rain increased to the point that I felt we were losing the required visibility.

As I went to press the TOGA (take-off/go-around) button to go around, we flew out of the back of the shower. I made a small flight path correction and we landed.

What did I learn?

1. Even very light rain showers can severely reduce visibility.

2. PAPI slope guidance cues can be rendered ineffective during a rain shower. Raw data, – attitude, thrust, and aim point need to be part of the plan.

3. If there is any rain activity anywhere near the airport, stick with the instrument approach rather than switching to a visual approach. That way you are better prepared and more predisposed to the real possibility of executing a missed approach. I had to rapidly re-evaluate our progress twice in a very short period of time.”

 

The bottom line from this real-world experience is that, having committed to a plan that can cover all contingencies in prevailing marginal circumstances, don’t abandon it for a less-capable alternative.

Furthermore, the effects of light refraction due to the rain on the windscreens should not be under-estimated.

Instrument procedures work fine in both IMC and VMC : Visual procedures are suitable only in VMC.

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

‘Mud or Mustard’ by former RAAF F-18 Top Gun Ralph Petritsch

You may well ask what the term ‘Mud or Mustard’ has to do with flying?

It does, in fact, have everything to do with being a fighter pilot. Well, these words form a key part of the catchcry echoed throughout the seat of air combat learning in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

This is the eighth article in a planned occasional series, sharing the most memorable and treasured experiences, not only from my own career : We plan to feature other, highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience.

Here, my great friend and colleague Ralph Petritsch, currently flying B787s, following an illustrious career as a fighter pilot and fighter combat instructor -‘Top Gun‘ on the RAAF FA-18A ‘Hornet’ and USAF F-15E ‘Eagle‘ shares some valuable insights that we can all apply to our own life experiences. (Photo courtesy of RAAF Williamtown Photograhic Section © 1986)

RAAF Base Williamtown is situated just north of Newcastle on Australia’s east coast. It is there that the young men and women of Australia train to become a fighter pilot and where they strive to join the ranks of the RAAF’s airborne fighting elite.

The full catchcry:

MUD or MUSTARD, SHIT or BLOOD, GRIT YOUR TEETH AND STAY THERE!’

These few words embody an ethos that is taken on as a core value for generations of young Australians who aspire to don the mantle of ‘fighter pilot’ within the RAAF. Like a commandment, it is an idea which forms a guiding principle to those who strap tonnes of metal and composite to their back and hurl themselves through space at speeds approaching those of a bullet. Their primary pursuit – excellence – air combat excellence.

The philosophy behind this curious phrase is as follows:

No matter what adversity you face – never give up. No matter how difficult your situation is or how insurmountable your odds seem – don’t relent. No matter how fearful your predicament or dire your situation – apply yourself, persist and commit to a successful outcome.

It may seem a little ‘gung-ho’, but this mindset is an essential one to have if you are to succeed in the incomprehensibly dynamic world of modern air combat. It is a world in which the earth tumbles violently around you, as you and your fighting-machine hurtle through the atmosphere at thousands of kilometres per hour, testing the very limits of pilot and machine, in an attempt to prosecute a designated target.

Some of the greatest air aces in history have attested to this way of thinking and affirmed that these principles were the difference, often, between success and failure in an air combat environment. That and perhaps the odd smattering of luck. Remember though, the harder you work – the luckier you get!

There is also the famous fighter pilot expression – ‘In air combat, there are no points for second place!’ Success in an air combat environment can be measured in many ways. Principally – you must win! Kill the bandit before he kills you and live to fight another day. Don’t die for your country, make the other pilot die for his!

In essence, these statements are fundamental truths, but the reality involves much, much more… Bring your weapons to bear on your chosen target efficiently and accurately. Prosecute your attack with conviction, without endangering yourself or your teammates. Maintain situational awareness of, and mutual support for, your wingman. A competent fighter pilot has to be effective, efficient, safe and reliable. I measured my own success as a fighter pilot against these core capabilities.

Adoption of, and belief in, the principles of ‘Mud or Mustard’ was instrumental in my success as a fighter pilot and has also had a profound impact on other areas of my life. This simple concept has provided inspiration during difficult times and become my benchmark attitude when tackling any challenges set before me. As I hope you’ll appreciate, being a fighter pilot is as much about this attitude, as it is about flying fast jets.

I am now long-retired from the RAAF and the outrageously dynamic world of air combat. However, my years of service to this great country taught me that with a commitment to sound processes, diligent application to training, focused attention to the execution of any task assigned to me and a determined attitude – ‘Mud or Mustard’ – anything is achievable.

Since leaving the Service, I have been drawn to people, practices and pursuits that apply the ‘Mud or Mustard’ philosophy. My love of flying has not waned and in furthering my aviation career, I have sought out the processes that are readily adaptable to the aforementioned attitude and which make the art of flying effective, efficient, safe and reliable.

One of the processes which I have found that lends itself well to the ‘Mud or Mustard’ concept is David Jacobson’s flare technique. It is simple to understand, precise, exacting and repeatable. As I have frequently found, if you take the time to read and understand a foolproof concept, practise it diligently and consistently apply it, it will serve you well and enhance your capabilities. I commend The Jacobson Flare to anyone who finds the practise of landing an aircraft a challenge or who, even if they have been landing successfully for years, just wants to better understand what they are doing and unlock the secret of how to execute landings with more finesse. Think of it as striving for – excellence – landing excellence!

Upon being made aware of the technique, by David himself, during one of my flights – crewing with him on a Boeing 737 – it was obvious to me that he had designed, developed and implemented a process that works. Every landing can be set up, executed and scrutinised later with accuracy and precision. The logical flow through: consistent and safe landings every time.

That I would adopt the Jacobson Flare as a standard tool in my flying toolbox was inevitable. It was right up my ‘fighter pilot alley‘. I have been using it ever since, on every landing, on every aeroplane that I have flown, from the smallest light sport aircraft through to the 250 tonne Boeing 787 Dreamliner.

Don’t just take my word for it. Get the app, read it, apply it and, with a bit of ‘Mud or Mustard’, watch how your landing technique improves. Honestly, you’ll wonder why nobody had solved the landing riddle, the way David has, before now.

In summing up, I was fortunate to have experienced the ‘tip of the aviation spear’ during operations in the fighter world. But flying fighters was as much about adopting a positive mental attitude and applying good processes, as it was about flying fast jets. These characteristics carry through to everyday life and are relevant to any aircraft you might choose to fly. To be a fighter pilot, you have to fly fighters, but anyone can have a fighter pilot attitude:

MUD or MUSTARD, SHIT or BLOOD, GRIT YOUR TEETH AND STAY THERE!

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

DJ B737-800W Melbourne VIC 22 June 2009

A few ‘pearls …’ Building pilots’ resilience in aviation

A few ‘pearls …’ Building pilots’ resilience in aviation

Over the years, one picks up many pearls of wisdom that shape our rapport with aviation: They could be gems offered by other pilots; they may come from something you read, perhaps from another’s own experience; or events that you experience, yourself, along the way.

In recent discussion, topics such as decision-making, threat and error management and embracing long-established standard operating procedures (SOPs) and cockpit resource management (CRM) have been floated past me. These essential yet sometimes intangible subjects can perhaps be included under the generic title, ‘building resilience’. It seems appropriate to share some of the ‘HOW’ to achieve some basic understanding of all this by recalling some ‘pearls’ that made themselves known to me along the way, since 1965.

This is the seventh article in a planned occasional series, sharing some most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is another from my own career : We do plan to feature other highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

Where possible, I shall acknowledge the sources of this collection of acquired wisdom that has served me well, not only in aviation, but in everyday life, as well. I commend it, especially, to inspire pilots just starting out. So, in no particular order:

 

Personal accountability

In 1965, my first flight instructor explained, “There is no excuse for a taxying accident.” He was so right.

Not much later, my Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) offered some sage advice: “When you’ve flown 100 hours, you’ll think you know it all; when you’ve gained 200 hours, you’ll know you know it all; and when you’ve reached 2000 hours, you’ll know you’ll never know it all!’  Well, even after 24,500 hours and 56 years exposure, I still feel like I just scratched the surface.

My CFI was the legendary ‘Jock’ Garden and he added this little gem after an assessment flight, when I had completed my first 3 hours of instrument flight training:

David, there are very few born instrument pilots – and you are not one of them!” As an 18-yo, that was somewhat deflating, but again, he was right: I really had to work at it.

Around 22 years later, in 1987, I was by now a (line) training captain and Jock was a passenger on my Trans-Australia Airlines’ (TAA) DC-9-30, flying from Melbourne to Adelaide and made it known that he was ‘down the back’. Naturally, I invited him up the flight deck for a quick chat (this was long before ‘9-11‘) and he remained with us for our descent and landing. After shutdown, I reminded him of his 1965 assessment of my instrument flying skills:

“Well”, he said, with a broad grin, “it must have worked. Look where you are, now!”

 

Through the B737-800 HUD : heading West, climbing to FL 400, at M 0.785 : Competency in instrument flying had its own rewards    © dj image

 

Common sense

There are some self-explanatory and sobering oldies and goodies, like, “The runway behind you, like the altitude above you and the fuel remaining in the tanker, are of no further use to you“, which do stimulate sound flight planning.

Upon my timely retirement from Qantas Airways Ltd, in February 2010, in a note of farewell published in the company’s flight ops newsletter, I summarised the ‘BIG 4’, of all the lessons I learned since 1965, including 40 years of airline flying:

Know when to go sick -Are you fit to fly? This includes personal issues, as well as medical; seek support and/or professional help;
Know when to go around  Don’t succumb to ‘press-on-itis’ – we rarely get a good landing off a bad approach;
Know when to divert or to turn back – If VFR-limited, you cannot teach yourself to fly on instruments in the last 30 seconds of your life; and
Know when to go – Be self-aware of your own limitations and bow out gracefully, before having to be reminded by others, or failing that last, one-too-many simulator or route checks.

 

Professional standards

In the second article in this series, ‘The best advice I was ever offered : from the best pilot I ever flew with’, published 7 July 2020, I referred, primarily, to Captain Geoff Lushey, who advised me, back in 1970, “It doesn’t matter when something goes wrong – What matters is what you do about it!‘. The same article includes a quotable quote from Captain Col Tiller, another very intelligent and perceptive TAA pilot. He told our cohort of inductees to TAA, earlier that same year, “When you pass a check, it only means you’ve been operating safely for the last 6 months: it has no bearing, whatsoever, on the next 6. On the other hand, if you fail a check, you haven’t just had a bad day: you’ve been unsafe for the last 6 months!I proved him dead right: read the article (from the link above, or the JF News App), for the details!

In 1971, as a 23-yo and just one year into my airline career with TAA, I had the opportunity to convert from the Fokker F27 Friendship to the McDonnell Douglas DC-9-30, my first jet. We completed the engineering and full-flight simulator courses in Melbourne, but the airline was still taking delivery of the type and couldn’t spare any aircraft off-line, for training purposes. We had, instead, the privilege of completing the 10-hour base flying component of the conversion with Hawaiian Airlines, based in Honolulu. (A tough gig, but someone had to do it!). My instructor was Captain Howard Phillips, Hawaiian’s most senior pilot and instructor. In just 2 years, I had leapt from flying a Cessna 337 with a maximum take-off weight of 4300lbs/1950kg, to the F27 at 43,500lb/19,731kgs and now the DC-9 at 100,000lbs/45,360kg. They were big steps.

I explained how I’d struggled a bit, initially, in the DC-9 simulator, trying not to over-control with aileron and rudder on asymmetric take-offs (simulated engine failures and fires). He responded, “Oh, a lot of our guys do that, too and you know what I tell ’em? I tell ’em to hold that ‘pole‘ (meaning all of the flight controls) like you’re tryin’ to milk a mouse (meaning very, very gently)!” Some homespun philosophy, perhaps, but it conveyed the message – and it sure works!

Captain Howard Phillips had another gem, too; perfect for those occasions when you realise your ‘mental-workload-required‘ is starting to exceed your ‘brain-power-available‘:  “When you’re up to your ass in alligators, it’s sometimes real (sic) difficult to remember that your initial aim was to drain the swamp!

 

Non-normal situations

As a kid, I recall Walt Disney hosting a TV episode of Disneyland and quoting Davy Crockett – the legendary US Frontiersman & Congressman. According to Disney, Crockett’s motto was, ‘Be sure you’re right – and then go ahead.’

Interestingly, when TAA introduced their initial and pioneering version of CRM, (which they termed Aircrew Team Management (ATM) in 1984, part of our training involved a problem-solving model known by its acronym, ‘S-A-D-I-E‘. The initials stood for the following steps and they expand on Davy Crockett’s motto:

Share the information available;
Analyse the information;
Develop a solution;
Implement the solution;
Evaluate the solution.

If the solution is not successful, repeat the last 3 steps, several times if necessary.

Along the way, in simulator training and licence checks, I learned the essential quality of sometimes ‘sitting on my hands’: in other words, not acting impulsively or precipitously. When suffering the loss of power or thrust, in a twin-engine airplane, it’s obviously vital NOT to shut down the wrong engine: it gets very quiet, very quickly! And, sadly, it has been done many times, with fatal consequences. The point is beautifully illustrated by a piece I read once, from a USAF test pilot:

When something does go wrong in an airplane, the very first thing I do is to start a stopwatch; it meets two fundamental human requirements:

It satisfies the intuitive urgency within us to do something immediately; and
It’s relatively harmless!

 

Operational pressures

In the airline environment and, I dare say, in the GA and military sectors, too, commercial and operational factors often place great pressure on pilots-in-command, to ‘get going’, often against their better judgment. When that pressure occurs, it’s vital to make a deliberate effort to slow down, ‘start that stopwatch’ and carefully apply the effective ‘S-A-D-I-E’ model.

A dispatch officer or company manager probably doesn’t have the full picture that you do. Remember that, when things go wrong, after departure, the responsibility for ‘everything’ rests with the pilot in command. Younger and less experienced commanders are vulnerable to these pressures and it shows, especially to the highly professional cabin service managers (CSMs) and flight attendants, with whom we share our responsibilities and duties of care for our passengers. I was once complimented and asked by one of our most professional CSMs, of 30+ years’ experience: “How do you stay so even, every time we fly with you? We always know it will be safe, professional and fun working with you.”

I hadn’t ever thought consciously about that, but I thanked her and was somehow able to summon the following response:

When I go flying, I have 4 priorities:

The safety of the airplane and my crew;
The security and comfort of my passengers;
Meeting the regulations and requirements of the government’s licensing authority; and finally,
Meeting the requirements of my employer.”

Now, it may seem odd, placing the Company last, but I figured that if I satisfied the first three priorities, my employer should have no cause for complaint – and, importantly, it placed that last element in its proper perspective:

OK, we’ve satisfied the first 3, now how can we best address that commercial element?’

Thinking further on this topic, later, I realised that I’d probably done this, subconsciously, ever since completing my first solo, as a 17-yo, way back in 1965; and my ‘second solo’ as a 34-yo, newly-minted F27 captain, in 1981.

It may also explain why professional pilots don’t necessarily feel the weight of responsibility for the safety of 36 or 174 or 400+ passengers. We would operate a freighter flight or ferry an empty airplane exactly the same way as if we had a full complement of fare-paying passengers.

Lesser Pressures: The ‘storm in the teacup’

In aviation, as in life, there are often some employment or other less important pressures that, while not operational, can nevertheless cause us stress and even grief to a disproportionate degree.

A beautiful solution was suggested to me by B747-400 Captain and Pilot Association President, Graeme Cant, back in 1993, when he offered the following:

When a storm blows up (- perhaps an industrial one -) the first thing I do is to go to my kitchen crockery cupboard and see what size teacup I need to contain it!’

 

Command upgrades

As a training captain for many years, on the DC-9-30 and, later, the B737-300/-400/-800, I was often asked by senior first officers, anticipating their own upgrade to initial command:

We’re licensed to the same standards; we already hold a command instrument rating and first-class airplane endorsement and I’ve been a FO for 8-/10-/12+ years. We share the flying, mostly ‘leg-for-leg’, so what’s the essential difference between how you operate from that LH seat, compared with what I do from the RH seat?

The basic premise of the question was spot-on. We did share the roles of ‘pilot-flying‘ and ‘pilot supporting‘ alternately and, as a training captain, I did fly and support from the RH seat, too, whenever I had the privilege of training a new captain, as he or she settled into the LH seat and its attendant, additional responsibilities. So I was current in both roles and I reckon the RH seat workload is higher. So, it was a great and a fair question – and therein lies a clue. My reply was, usually:

As a first officer, you’ve become accustomed to being able to answer – or know where to find the answers – to most things. As a captain, you’ve got to know the questions.” This was not meant to be a glib throw-away line. By this, I meant that professional captains are always asking themselves, ‘What if …?‘, trying to anticipate all possible scenarios and potential outcomes that may affect their present operation.

As a practical and valuable example, many aircraft type non-normal quick-reference handbooks (QRHs) include a procedure, detailing the failure of ALL generators, which could place the aircraft in the situation of relying solely on a ‘Standby‘ or ‘Emergency’ DC power supply, powered by the battery system, for just 30-60 minutes. It’s common for pilots to note or even commit to memory, the minimal electrical services available on ‘Standby Power’. But a great question is: ‘What services have we lost, if we have the generators and main electrical systems operating normally, but the ‘Standby’ orEmergency’ DC power supply fails?‘ It’s generally ignored, as a ‘cannot possibly happen‘ event. if it can be imagined, it can happen.

In the case of the wonderful Fokker F27 Friendship, (my first airliner and my first airline command aircraft), along with other  services lost when operating with the emergency DC power supply failed, ‘Ground Fine’ pitch or 0º pitch angle could not be selected on the propellers: the blade angle would ‘hang-up’ on the 16.5º fine pitch ‘stop(designed to prevent fine pitch blade angles in flight, which could overspeed the propellers) and, after completing a landing with this condition, the Rolls-Royce Dart engines – turning at significantly reduced RPM – would probably overheat and melt turbine blades onto the runway or taxiway, through high internal temperatures and insufficient airflow!

The only solution to protect those engines, was to shut them both down after such a landing, BEFORE decelerating through about 40 Kts – and then requesting a tow to the terminal! And this serious point was NOT highlighted in the manufacturer’s or airlines’ flight operating or training manuals.

While operating a flight sector, great flight crew members, not just commanders, will  be thinking ahead to the next leg and the next: weather considerations, fuel requirements, payload or airplane performance limitations, non-standard configuration considerations: the list goes on. But, with a conscientious work ethic and quality training, it’s not a chore. Command training should be fun, re-affirming everything you’ve learned throughout your career to date and adding your stamp to it. You’ve done the hard work, over many years. Now is the time to apply it. Enjoy!

 

Fearful flyers

A sad reality is that some of our passengers develop a fear of flying, for all sorts of reasons, generally not due to anything that they, themselves, have experienced. It is often due to a simple lack of understanding of how an airplane flies and ‘manages to stay up there.’ Sometimes, a friend or relative has scared them with a tale based on heresy, not fact.

Prior to ‘9-11’, it was sometimes possible, operationally, to invite a nervous passenger to visit the flight deck and it paid instant dividends -always. We could answer their specific questions or concerns; they could see that nothing was happening quickly on the flight deck, even though we were moving through the atmosphere at 450kts or 900km/hr. Often, the response was so apparent that we might extend an invitation to the passenger to remain with us, strap in to the ‘spare jump seat’ and a headset and experience the rare privilege of sharing the descent and landing, at our destination. In my experience, the results achieved were 110% successful! Passengers disembarked smiling, fully relaxed and would often stay, “Thank you so much, I’m cured!

Very often, it seemed that the word, FEAR had been mis-represented as an acronym, F-E-A-R: ‘Fantasy – Expressed -As -Reality‘.

Fear of Flying‘ courses are sponsored by many airlines, to assist passengers to alleviate these unfortunate feelings. They are highly recommended.

Finally, without in any way wishing to diminish the reality of the ‘fearful flyer’ condition, let’s conclude with the light-hearted preface from ‘Spitfire Parade‘, one of the many books in the famous series of  children’s (and parent’s-) own’ ‘Biggles‘ books (and radio serials) by Captain W.E Johns, highlighting the life and times of the fictitious British WW2 pilot and, later, Scotland Yard air detective Air Inspector James Biggleworth, known far and wide as ‘Biggles‘. Entitled ‘Biggles’ Philosophy‘, it went like this:

 

‘When you are flying, everything is either all right, or it’s not alright.

If it is alright, there is no need to worry; if it’s not alright, one of two things is certain:

Either you are in trouble, or you’re not in trouble.

If you are not in trouble, there is no need to worry; if you are in trouble, one of two things is certain:

Either you will crash, or you won’t crash.

If you don’t crash, there is no need to worry; if you do crash, one of two things is certain:

Either you will be injured, or you won’t be injured.

If you are not injured, there is no need to worry; if you are injured, one of two things is certain:

Either you’ll recover, or you won’t recover.

If you do recover, there is no need to worry;

And, finally, if you don’t recover, you can’t worry!’

 

The bottom line

It may become apparent, if not already, that many, if not all of the above vignettes apply not only to aviation, but in everyday life, as well. They certainly have, for me.

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.